Subsidizing Consumption to Signal Quality of Workers

A firm whose profits increase when outsiders believe that it pays high wages may induce its workers to over-consume goods that signal high compensation. One implication is that firms may lobby government to subsidize fringe benefits with high signaling value, such as company cars, to their employees. We show that under plausible conditions the provision of fringe benefits indeed can signal the firm's type. Moreover, we demonstrate the existence of multiple equilibria---one equilibrium has no firm providing certain fringe benefits, whereas another equilibrium has fringe benefits signal the firm's type. The paper further shows that a firm that provides the fringe benefit may oppose a government subsidizing it too heavily, because a large subsidy could destroy the signaling value of the benefit. The analysis shows that an employer may even provide a fringe benefit to employees who place no value on it. Our results are consistent with many stylized facts on the provision of fringe benefits by firms. More generally, we the model highlights how and why a firm may engage in behavior which signals the type of workers it hires.Signaling; Fringe benefits; Compensation

A political economy model of road pricing

In this paper, we take a political economy approach to study the introduction of urban congestion tolls, using a simple majority voting model. Making users pay for external congestion costs is for an economist an obvious reform, but successful introductions of externality pricing in transport are rare. The two exceptions are London and Stockholm that are characterized by two salient facts. First, the toll revenues were tied to improvements of public transport. Second, although a majority was against road pricing before it was actually introduced, a majority was in favor of the policy reform after its introduction. This paper constructs a model to explain these two aspects. Using a stylized model with car and public transport, we show that it is easier to obtain a majority when the toll revenues are used to subsidize public transport than when they are used for a tax refund. Furthermore, introducing idiosyncratic uncertainty for car substitution costs, we can explain the presence of a majority that is ex ante against road pricing and ex post in favor. The ex ante majority against road pricing also implies that there is no majority for organizing an experiment that would take away the individual uncertainty.

A political economy model of road pricing.

In this paper, we take a political economy approach to study the introduction of urban congestion tolls, using a simple majority voting model. Making users pay for external congestion costs is for an economist an obvious reform, but successful introductions of externality pricing in transport are rare. The two exceptions are London and Stockholm that are characterized by two salient facts. First, the toll revenues were tied to improvements of public transport. Second, although a majority was against road pricing before it was actually introduced, a majority was in favor of the policy reform after its introduction. This paper constructs a model to explain these two aspects. Using a stylized model with car and public transport, we show that it is easier to obtain a majority when the toll revenues are used to subsidize public transport than when they are used for a tax refund. Furthermore, introducing idiosyncratic uncertainty for car substitution costs, we can explain the presence of a majority that is ex ante against road pricing and ex post in favor. The ex ante majority against road pricing also implies that there is no majority for organizing an experiment that would take away the individual uncertainty.

Vertical and horizontal tax competition in the transport sector

The purpose of this paper is to review the literature dealing with horizontal and vertical tax competition in the transport sector, taking into account the role of transport externalities. Our emphasis throughout is on tax competition between governments, not between private suppliers. For the various different settings (horizontal and vertical competition, parallel and serial networks), we discuss the relevance of tax competition and describe the type of results typically obtained. We further point out the relevance of different types of tax competition for transport policy in a European setting. Finally, we discuss the losses of non-cooperative behaviour of governments.

Transport tax reform, commuting and endogenous values of time

Previous studies of transport tax reform have typically assumed that the reform itself does not affect the marginal value of time. In this paper we consider a model of urban transport with two trip purposes, commuting and non-commuting, to analyse the effects of transport tax reform on the value of time and marginal external congestion costs. The theoretical results suggest that the assumption of multiple trip purposes implies that these effects are non-trivial. Consequently, assuming exogenous time values may lead to inaccurate estimates of optimal congestion taxes and of the welfare effects of transport tax reform. Empirical work using Belgian data illustrates the potentially large effect of transport tax reform on time values. In fact, the majority of the tax reform exercises studied reduce traffic levels but raise time values and marginal external congestion costs.tax reform; congestion; value of time

Capacity cost structure, welfare and cost recovery: are transport infrastructures with high fixed costs a handicap?.

In this paper, we consider a region that invests in infrastructure used by both local demand and through transport. We then compare transport systems that have, for a given capacity, the same total infrastructure cost but vary in the proportion of fixed costs and variable capacity costs. We show, first, that infrastructure which has (ceteris paribus) a higher share of fixed costs leads to higher welfare for the regional government building it. Contrary to what is commonly believed, it therefore requires less, rather than more, federal subsidies. Second, we find that, even for capacity characterized by, ceteris paribus, very high shares of fixed costs, financing of infrastructure is generally not an important issue as long as regions are allowed to toll through traffic. Third, if member states cannot toll through traffic, or if a federal authority (such as the EU or the USA) can impose pricing at the global marginal social cost, our analysis shows that this reduces investment incentives for the individual regions, and subsidies may be needed. We discuss the policy implications of these findings and illustrate all theoretical results numerically.Capacity cost structure; Cost recovery; Transport investment;

Strategic investment and pricing decisions in a congested transport corridor

This paper studies pricing and investment decisions on a congested transport corridor where the elements of the corridor are controlled by different governments. A corridor can be an interstate highway or railway line, or an inter-modal connection. We model the simplest corridor: two transport links in series, where each of the links is controlled by a different government. Each link is used by transit as well as by local traffic; both links are subject to congestion. We consider a two stage non-cooperative game where both governments strategically set capacity in the first stage and play a pricing game in the second stage. Three pricing regimes are distinguished: (i) differentiated tolls between local and transit transport, (ii) one uniform toll on local and transit traffic, and (iii) only the local users can be tolled. Numerical analysis illustrates all theoretical insights. A number of interesting results are obtained. First, transit tolls on the network will be inefficiently high. If only local traffic can be tolled, however, the Nash equilibrium tolls are inefficiently low. Second, raising the toll on transit through a given country by one euro raises the toll on the whole trajectory by less than one euro. Third, higher capacity investment in a given region not only reduces optimal tolls in this region under all pricing regimes but it also increases the transit tolls on the other link of the corridor. Fourth, capacities in the different regions are strategic complements: when one country on the corridor increases transport capacity, it forces the other country to do the same. Fifth, we find interesting interactions between optimal capacities and the set of pricing instruments used: capacity with differentiated tolls is substantially higher than in the case of uniform tolls but overall welfare is lower. Finally, if transit is sufficiently important, it may be welfare improving not to allow any tolling at all, or to only allow the tolling of locals.congestion pricing, transport investment, transit traffic

Tax reform for dirty intermediate goods: Theory and an application to the taxation of freight transport.

Tax reform; Theory; Transport; Working;

Tax reform for dirty intermediate goods: theory and an application to the taxation of freight transport

The purpose of this paper is to study, within a general equilibrium framework, the welfare implications of a balanced-budget tax reform for an externality-generating intermediate input in a second-best economic environment. For purposes of concreteness, the focus is on tax reform for freight road transport to cope with congestion externalities; results for other types of externalities can be derived as special cases. The model takes into account that passenger and freight flows jointly produce congestion, it captures feedback effects in demand, and it allows for existing distortions on all other input and output markets, including the passenger transport market and the labour market. Moreover, it clearly shows that the welfare effects of the reform depend on the instruments used to recycle the tax revenues. A numerical version of the model is calibrated to UK data. The numerical results suggest, among others, that (i) the welfare gain of a given freight tax reform rises with the level of the tax on the market for passenger transport; (ii) the higher the rate of passenger transport taxation, the lower the optimal freight tax; and (iii) compared to lump-sum recycling, both the welfare effects of a tax reform and the optimal tax are substantially higher when revenues are recycled via labour taxes.externalities; transport; taxes; freight; tax reform

The interactin between tolls and capacity investment in serial and parallel transport networks

The purpose of this paper is to compare the interaction between pricing and capacity decisions on simple serial and parallel transport networks. When individual links of the network are operated by different regional or national authorities, toll and capacity competition is likely to result. Moreover, the problem is potentially complicated by the presence of both local and transit demand on each link of the network. We bring together and extend the recent literature on the topic and, using both theory and numerical simulation techniques, provide a careful comparison of toll and capacity interaction on serial and parallel network structures. First, we show that there is more tax exporting in serial transport corridors than on competing parallel road networks. Second, the inability to toll transit has quite dramatic negative welfare effects on parallel networks. On the contrary, in serial transport corridors it may actually be undesirable to allow the tolling of transit at all. Third, if the links are exclusively used by transit transport, toll and capacity decisions are independent in serial networks. This does not generally hold in the presence of local transport. Moreover, it contrasts with a parallel setting where regional authorities compete for transit; in that case, regional investment in capacity leads to lower Nash equilibrium tolls.congestion pricing, transport investment, transit traffic